arrangements with the insurgent leadership could be the opening wedge for a successful political attempt to nullify the threat of armed struggle."

What happened to the "opening wedge?" The Aquino government has had considerable difficulty in formulating a political solution to the insurgency, especially in providing rehabilitation and jobs for rebels who lay down their weapons, in implementing a comprehensive rural development policy, and in controlling military and paramilitary forces. The use of military strikes against the rebels has increased. Aquino has asked the U.S. for stepped up military assistance, including helicopter gunships. The U.S. is providing more counterinsurgency aid, including increased covert operations and intelligence work by the CIA. Hence, the initial political approach of the Aquino government has become substantially militarized. Why? According to Porter's analysis, a military approach to the insurgency is not likely to be more successful. Her government's turn-around in counter-insurgency policy reflects the problems Aquino faces in consolidating her own power base and in offering meaningful reform proposals that might induce rebel leaders to stop fighting. In long-term perspective, the government-rebel ceasefire may be regarded as having been a useful interlude for both sides to reorganize, resupply, and resume their struggle.

David Rosenberg
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

The Philippine Bases: U.S. Security at Risk. By *A. James Gregor* and *Virgilio Aganon*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987, [?] pp.

This slim volume actually presents two essays in one: an argument for the continued presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines and an analysis of the "post-Marcos succession."

The case for retention of the bases by and large consists of the usual Pentagon justifications along with the standard misrepresentations. The Soviet Union, charge Gregor and Aganon, has been engaged in "one of the most formidable military buildups in history," as a result of which "between 1960 and 1980 few trends related to the U.S.-Soviet military balance favored the United States." (p. 8) This is either a trivial observation (since, given U.S. strategic superiority in 1962, the Soviet achievement of rough parity a decade later would require a much greater proportional increase on the part of the USSR) or simple distortion, as when the authors mention the number of ICBMs (where the Soviets lead), but not the number of warheads, submarine launched missiles, etc. (where the U.S. has the lead); or when they compare *numbers* of aircraft or ships, taking no account of quality, even though U.S. officials have chosen quality over quantity because they considered that this yields more military potential per dollar.

The Soviet Union's Kirov class battle cruiser, the authors write, is "the

largest warship (other than an aircraft carrier) built by any nation since the end of World War Two" (p. 9)--which sounds frightening indeed until one realizes that the largest warship built by any nation since World War II is precisely the parenthetical aircraft carrier, of which the United States has 15. Gregor and Aganon warn that two of Moscow's four aircraft carriers are assigned to its Pacific fleet (p. 18), but do not tell us that these vessels are incapable of carrying fixed-wing aircraft and are incomparably inferior to any U.S. carrier; Moscow is only now completing its first real aircraft carrier, but even this, as U.S. Navy experts acknowledge, will not give the Soviet navy a true power projection capability until well into the next decade (*Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, Dec. 1985).

The Philippine bases, Gregor and Aganon assert, help to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea where there are many conflicting territorial claims (pp. 23-32). But the U.S. presence was not of much help to East Timor, invaded by Indonesia with U.S. weapons and diplomatic support; nor to Vietnam, "taught a lesson" by China after Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington. The most likely violence in the South China Sea would involve a Chinese attack on Vietnamese-held islands (or on reefs, now of dubious ownership, that may prove oil-rich); the USSR would probably do more to deter such an attack than would the United States, but of course it is U.S. hegemony, not peace-keeping, that Gregor and Aganon seek.

The Soviet naval buildup reminds Gregor and Aganon of Japan before World War II (p. 10), a remarkable parallel given that the only superpower navy involved in combat in the last decade has been that of the United States (Lebanon, Grenada, Libya).

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., who contributed the introduction to this book, writes of a 1986 Vladivostok speech by Soviet leader Gorbachev which, he says, "challenged the United States for dominance in East Asia." (p. ix) In fact, in this speech Gorbachev, aside from offering concessions on Afghanistan and calling for improved relations with China, hinted that if the United States would withdraw from the Philippines, the Soviet Union would evacuate its bases in Vietnam. Such a trade-off would obviate all the direful strategic analyses provided by Gregor and Aganon, who entirely ignore the Gorbachev proposal, and all other peace proposals, for that matter.

The part of the book dealing with Philippine politics is rather more interesting than the recycled rationalizations for the bases, because Gregor and Aganon inadvertently help to explain Washington's policy since Aquino's accession.

Gregor was one of those who supported Marcos right to the end because the moderate opposition tended to oppose U.S. bases. State Department pragmatists and Congressional liberals--who have been as fervent in their support for the bases as conservatives like Gregor--were more astute, however, in seeing that continued backing for the doomed Marcos posed the biggest threat to the bases. But Gregor and the pragmatists were back in agreement in appreciating the dilemma that faced the United States once Aquino took office. As Gregor

and Aganon describe it, under the free-market policies of the Philippine government and the austerity required by international financial institutions, the Philippine economy will probably remain weak; the weak economy will mean that the communist insurgency will continue to grow; communist strength plus economic weakness will encourage the moderates to move toward some sort of accommodation of the left; and any such left-center alliance will certainly lead to the removal of the U.S. bases because both the left *and many of the moderates* oppose the continued U.S. military presence; therefore, the best assurance for U.S. interests is the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is hostile to the left and center and supportive of the U.S. bases (pp. 66-68, 96-97, 107-09).

This does not mean dumping Aquino, for U.S. policy-makers are well aware that Filipino military rulers would be as incapable as was Marcos of containing popular discontent. But the situation has called for pushing Aquino decisively to the right, to subordinate her to the armed forces, and thus to U.S. interests. After each attempted military coup (strangely ignored by Gregor and Aganon), Washington has urged--and its leverage is immense--that the mutineers not be punished. So instead of disciplining blatant traitors, Aquino has purged liberals from her Cabinet, cracked down on strikers, given the military immunity from prosecution for human rights violations, and encouraged the organization of vigilantes, moves all endorsed by the U.S.

Gregor and Aganon try to make it seem that the Armed Forces of the Philippines' reputation for massive human rights abuses has been unwarranted. (One may recall Gregor's 1984 assertion that it was implausible that anyone responsible to the Marcos government could have been directly involved in the murder of Benigno Aquino [*Crisis in the Philippines*, Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984, p. 58].) Gregor and Aganon tell us that one 1984 book collected "all the rumors and bits of hearsay" to defame the AFP (p. 57), as though the existence of a sensationalist account allows one to ignore the extensive documentary record of massive human rights violations. But human rights violations are evidently of little consequence to those, like Gregor and Aganon, who seek an extension of the current military bases agreement for "a minimum of twenty-five years" (p. 110).

When Reagan was asked in February, 1986, whether Philippine democracy was as important as the bases, he replied that one could not overestimate the value of the bases. More discreet U.S. officials have since tried to suggest that they favor both the bases and democracy. But, as Gregor and Aganon's book makes clear, the hostility of many centrist Filipinos to the bases requires Washington to make a choice. And, unfortunately, both the White House and the Congress seem to be choosing the bases.

Stephen Rosskamm Shalom
WILLIAM PATERSON COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY